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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this Appeal are the Plaintiff/Appellant Dee
Henshaw, and the Defendant/Appellee the Utah Department of
Transportation, (hereinafter, "UDOT").
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IV
JURISDICTION
Original jurisdiction of this matter was vested in the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (3)(j), Utah Code Ann.
1953, as amended.

Jurisdiction is now vested in this Court

pursuant to the provisions of § 78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as
amended.

V
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues on appeal are as follows:
Issues of Fact
1.

Did the trial court err in concluding that there were
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no genuine issues of material fact present in this case which
precluded the trial court from entering summary judgment in favor
of UDOT?
2.

Did the trial court err in concluding that there were

no genuine issues of material fact present in this case which
precluded the trial court from entering summary judgment in favor
of Sweeney?
A, Did the trial court err in concluding that Mr. Henshaw's
cause of action against Sweeney for Breach of Contract arose
in July 1985?
B.
Did the trial court err in concluding that Mr.
Henshaw's cause of action against Sweeney for fraudulent
inducement accrued no later than July 1985?
Standard of Review
When reviewing an appeal from summary judgment, the
appellate court must construe the facts and view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the losing party.

Geneva Pipe Co. v.

S & H Ins. Co.. 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986); Lucky Seven Rodeo
Corp. v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. App.1988).
Issues of Law
1.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting

UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment?
2.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting

Sweeney's Motion to Dismiss?
Standard of Review
Because a summary judgment motion is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise
5

the trial court's legal conclusions.

Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l

Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987);

Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v.

Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752, (Utah Ct. App.1988).

VI
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES.RULES. AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
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Rice v. Granite School District. 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159,
163 (1969)
Vencent v. Salt Lake County. 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1981)
Statutes;
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended, § 63-30-3
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, § 78-2-2(3)(j)
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, § 78-2-2(4)
Rules;
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12

Treatises:
92 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser, § 284, § 285

vn
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(A)
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment rendered by Judge Leslie
Lewis in favor of Defendant Ireene Sweeney granting her motion to
dismiss Mr, Henshaw's Complaint, and an appeal from a grant of
summary judgment entered by Judge J. Dennis Frederick granting
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
(B)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT LEVEL
1.

Mr. Henshaw filed his Complaint against UDOT and

Sweeney on February 6, 1992.
2.

On March 9, 1992, Defendant UDOT filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment.
3.

On March 23, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed an Amended

Complaint.
4.

On March 30, 1992, Defendant Sweeney filed a Motion to

Dismiss.
5.

A hearing was scheduled for UDOT's Motion and Sweeney's

Motion.
6.

Judge Lewis granted Sweeney's Motion.
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7.

However, on June 4, 1992, Judge Lewis took under

advisement UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
8.

On June 23, 1992, Judge Lewis ruled that UDOT's Motion

for Summary Judgment was rendered moot by an order entered on
June 22, 1992, dismissing with prejudice all counts of Mr.
Henshaw's Complaint.
9.

On July 23, 1992, Judge Lewis set aside the June 22,

1992 Order.
10.

On October 23, 1992, Judge Lewis sent a letter

requesting that the parties state whether they object to Judge
Lewis remaining on the case pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Regional

Agency, Inc., v. Reichart.

Pursuant to

that letter, counsel for Mr. Henshaw, requested that Judge Lewis
recuse herself from this case and requested that another judge be
assigned to the case.
11.

Judge Lewis refused to rule on UDOT's Motion for

Summary Judgment, taken under advisement on June 4, 1992, and on
March 4, 1994, Judge Murphy assigned the case to Judge Frederick.
12.

On March 29, 1994, Judge Frederick denied UDOT's Motion

for Summary Judgment.
13.

On April 19, 1994, Judge Frederick signed an order

directing UDOT to file an answer to Mr. Henshaw's Amended
Complaint within ten days.
14.

On May 5, 1994, Judge Frederick signed and entered a

Default Judgment against UDOT.
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15.

On May 11, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice of Judgment

against UDOT.
16.

On May 12, 1994, UDOT filed an answer to Mr. Henshaw's

Amended Complaint.
17.

On May 13, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion to Set Aside the

Default Judgment.
18.

On June 24, 1994, Judge Frederick set aside the Default

Judgment against UDOT and entered an order directing Mr. Henshaw
to certify the matter for trial within thirty days.
19.

On June 29, 1994, Mr. Henshaw, pursuant to the

stipulation with UDOT, filed a Second Amended Complaint.
20.

On June 30, 1994, the trial court filed a stipulation

signed by Mr. Henshaw and UDOT setting aside the Default
Judgment.
21.

On June 30, 1994, Judge Frederick signed the Order

setting aside the Default Judgment and allowing Mr. Henshaw to
file a Second Amended Complaint.
22.

On July 8, 1994, UDOT filed an answer to Mr. Henshaw1s

Second Amended Complaint.
23.

On July 15, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Demand for Jury

Trial and paid the required Jury Fee.
24.

On July 26, 1994, Mr. Henshaw served UDOT with his

First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and
Requests for Production of Documents and filed a Certificate of
Discovery.
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25.

On July 28, 1994, Judge Frederick signed another order

setting aside the Default Judgment against UDOT and stating that
Mr. Henshaw had to certify the case for trial within thirty days
of June 24, 1994.
26.

On August 3, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment and a Motion for a Protective Order.
27.

On

August 4, 1994, Judge Frederick granted UDOT's

Motion for a Protective Order.
28.

On August 15, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to

Reconsider the trial court's Order of June 28, 1994.
29.

On August 16, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
30.

On August 26, 1994, UDOT filed a Reply Memorandum in

Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.
31.

On September 1, 1994, Judge Frederick denied Mr.

Henshaw's Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Strike
the Affidavit of Max Williams, and Mr. Henshaw's Objection to
UDOT's Protective Order.
32.

On September 1, 1994, Judge Frederick also granted

UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
33.

On September 26, 1994, the trial court entered an order

granting Summary Judgment in favor of UDOT and denying Mr.
Henshaw's Motion to Reconsider the Order of June 28, 1994, Mr.
Henshaw's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Max Williams and Mr.
Henshaw's Objection to UDOT's Protective Order.
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34.

On October 25, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed his Notice of

Appeal.
(C)
DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRIAL COURT
1.

Judge Lewis granted Sweeney's Motion on June 4, 1992.

2.

However, on June 4, 1992, Judge Lewis took under

advisement UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
3.

On June 23, 1992, Judge Lewis ruled that UDOT's Motion

for Summary Judgment was rendered moot by an order entered on
June 22, 1992, dismissing with prejudice all counts of Mr.
Henshaw's Complaint.
4.

On July 23, 1992, Judge Lewis set aside the June 22,

1992 Order.
5.

On March 29, 1994, Judge Frederick denied UDOT's Motion

for Summary Judgment.
6.

On August 3, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment and a Motion for a Protective Order.
7.

On September 1, 1994, Judge Frederick granted UDOT's

Motion for Summary Judgment.
8.

On September 26, 1994, the trial court entered an order

granting Summary Judgment in favor of UDOT and denying Mr.
Henshaw's Motion to Reconsider the Order of June 28, 1994, Mr.
Henshaw's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Max Williams and Mr.
Henshaw's Objection to UDOT's Protective Order.
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(D)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Appellant, Mr. Henshaw, filed his Complaint on

February 6, 1992.
2.

(Record at page 2).

On March 9, 1992, Defendant UDOT filed a Motion and

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Record at

page 28, 31).
3.
Complaint.
4.

On March 23, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed an Amended
(Record at page 52).
On March 23, 1992, a Request for Hearing was filed.

(Record at page 87).
5.

On March 23, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Record at

page 39).
6.
Dismiss.
7.

On March 30, 1992, Defendant Sweeney filed a Motion to
(Record at page 74).
On March 30, 1992, Defendant Sweeney filed a Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss.
(Record at page 77).
8.

On March 31, 1992, Defendant UDOT filed a Reply

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Record at

page 89).
9.

On April 10, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Ireene Sweeneys Motion to Dismiss.

(Record at page

98) .
10.

On April 20, 1992, Defendant Sweeney filed a Reply
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to
Dismiss.
11.

(Record at page 121).
On April 20, 1992, Sweeney filed a Request for Hearing.

(Record at page 116).
12.

On April 23, 1992, Defendant Sweeney filed a Motion to

Dismiss Amended Complaint.
13.

A hearing was scheduled for UDOT's Motion and Sweeney's

Motion for June 4, 1992.
14.

(Record at page 143).

(Record at page 151).

On June 4, 1992, Judge Lewis granted Sweeney's Motion.

(Record at page 153).
15.

However, on June 4, 1992, Judge Lewis took under

advisement UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Record at page

153) .
16.

On June 23, 1992, Judge Lewis ruled that UDOT's Motion

for Summary Judgment was rendered moot by an order entered on
June 22, 1992, dismissing with prejudice all counts of Mr.
Henshaw's Complaint.
17.

(Record at page 159).

On July 6, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion and

Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Set Aside Defendant's
Order of Dismissal.
18.

(Record at page 161, 162).

On July 13, 1992, Defendant UDOT filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal.

(Record at

page 170).
19.

On July 16, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed a Reply Memorandum

in Support of Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal.
page 181).
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(Record at

20.

On July 17, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice of Appeal.

(Record at page 186).
21.

On July 17, 1992, Mr. Henshaw file a Notice to Submit

for Decision on Mr. Henshaw1s Motion to Set Aside Judgment.
(Record at page 188).
22.

On July 20, 1992, UDOT filed a Notice to Submit on Mr.

Henshaw1s Motion to Set Aside Order.
23.

On July 23, 1992, Judge Lewis set aside the June 22,

1992 Order.
24.

(Record at page 193).

On August 10, 1992, Mr. Henshaw filed an Objection to

Proposed Order of Dismissal.
25.

(Record at page 191).

(Record at page 196).

On August 12, 1992, UDOT filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Objection to Proposed Order of Dismissal.

(Record

at page 201).
26.

On October 9, 1992, the Supreme Court dismissed and

remanded the case.
27.

(Record at page 212).

On October 23, 1992, Judge Lewis sent a letter

requesting that the parties state whether they object to Judge
Lewis remaining on the case pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Regional Agency, Inc., v. Reichart.

Pursuant to that

letter, counsel for Mr. Henshaw, requested that Judge Lewis
recuse herself from this case and requested that another judge be
assigned to the case.
28.

(Record at page 216).

On March 31, 1993, Defendant Sweeney filed an Order of

Dismissal with Prejudice.
29.

(Record at page 218).

On March 4, 1994, Judge Lewis recused herself from this
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case.

(Record at page 240).
30.

Judge Lewis refused to rule on UDOT's Motion for

Summary Judgment, taken under advisement on June 4, 1992, and on
March 4, 1994, Judge Murphy assigned the case to Judge Frederick.
(Record at page 243).
31.

On March 11, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to

Disqualify Judge Lewis.
32.
Submit.

(Record at page 244).

On March 25, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice to
(Record at page 254).

33.

On March 29, 1994, Judge Frederick denied UDOT's Motion

for Summary Judgment.
34.

(Record at page 256).

On April 19, 1994, Judge Frederick signed an order

directing UDOT to file an answer to Mr. Henshaw1s Amended
Complaint within ten days.
35.
UDOT.

(Record at page 258).

On May 5, 1994, the Court entered a Default against

(Record at page 262) .
36.

On May 6, 1994, Judge Frederick signed and entered a

Default Judgment against UDOT.
37.

(Record at page 264).

On May 6, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed an Ex Parte Motion

for Entry of Default Judgment.
38.
Judgment.
39.

On May 11, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Notice of
(Record at page 266).
On May 12, 1994, UDOT filed an answer to Mr. Henshaw1s

Amended Complaint.
40.

(Record at page 263).

(Record at page 268).

On May 13, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion and Memorandum in

Support of Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default and Default
15

Judgment.
41.

(Record at page 277, 279).
On May 25, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendants Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.
(Record at page 298).
42.

On June 20, 1994, a Notice to Submit was filed.

(Record at page 302).
43.

On June 24, 1994, Judge Frederick set aside the Default

Judgment against UDOT and entered an order directing Mr. Henshaw
to certify the matter for trial within thirty days of June 24,
1994.

(Record at page 304).
44.

On June 29, 1994, Mr. Henshaw, pursuant to stipulation

with UDOT, filed a Second Amended Complaint.

(Record at page

306) .
45.

On June 30, 1994, the trial court filed a stipulation

signed by Mr. Henshaw and UDOT setting aside the Default Judgment
and allowing Mr. Henshaw to file a Second Amended Complaint.
(Record at page 330).
46.

On June 30, 1994, Judge Frederick signed the Order

setting aside the Default Judgment and allowing Mr. Henshaw to
file a Second Amended Complaint.
47.

On July 8, 1994, UDOT filed an Answer to Mr. Henshaw's

Second Amended Complaint.
48.

(Record at page 3 32).

(Record at page 336).

On July 15, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Demand for Jury

Trial and paid the required Jury Fee.
49.

(Record at page 353).

On July 18, 1994, Mr. Henshaw served UDOT with his

First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and
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Requests for Production of Documents and filed a Certificate of
Discovery.
50.

(Record at page 355) .
On July 28, 1994, Judge Frederick signed another order

setting aside the Default Judgment against UDOT and stating that
Mr. Henshaw had to certify the case for trial within thirty days
of June 24, 1994.
51.

(Record at page 357).

On August 3, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion and Memorandum

in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Record at page 360-

362) .
52.

On August 3, 1994, UDOT filed a Motion and Memorandum

in Support of Motion for a Protective Order.

(Record at page

401-403).
53.

On August 3, 1994, UDOT filed a Request for Hearing.

(Record at page 406).
54.

On

August 4, 1994, Judge Frederick granted UDOT's

Motion for a Protective Order.
55.

(Record at page 408).

On August 15, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion and

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order
of July 28, 1994.
56.

(Record at page 420, 422).

On August 16, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Record at

page 429).
57.

On August 19, 1994, UDOT filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Motion to Reconsider Minute Entry of June 24, 1994,
and Order of July 28, 1994.
58.

(Record at page 498).

On August 22, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed an Objection to
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Proposed Order.
59.

(Record at page 507).

On August 23, 1994, UDOT filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Mr. Henshaw's Objection to UDOT's Proposed Order.
(Record at page 509).
60.

On August 26, 1994, UDOT filed a Reply Memorandum in

Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.

(Record at page

513) .
61.

On August 30, 1994, a Notice to Submit was filed.

(Record at page 567).
62.

On August 30, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed a Reply

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Order of July 28,
1994.

(Record at page 552).
63.

On September 1, 1994, Judge Frederick denied Mr.

Henshaw's Motion to Reconsider, Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Strike
the Affidavit of Max Williams, and Mr. Henshaw's Objection to
UDOT's Protective Order.
64.

(Record at page 569).

On September 1, 1994, Judge Frederick also granted

UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
65.

(Record at page 569).

On September 26, 1994, the trial court entered an order

granting Summary Judgment in favor of UDOT and denying Mr.
Henshaw's Motion to Reconsider the Order of July 28, 1994, Mr.
Henshaw's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Max Williams and Mr.
Henshaw's Objection to UDOT's Protective Order.

(Record at page

590) .
66.
Appeal.

On October 25, 1994, Mr. Henshaw filed his Notice of
(Record at page 594).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred both as a matter of fact and as a
matter of law when it granted UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
There are genuine issues of material fact present in this case
which precluded the trial Court from granting UDOT's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

The trial court also erred in granting UDOT's

Motion for Summary Judgment because UDOT was not entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.
The trial court erred both as a matter of fact and as a
matter of law when it granted Sweeney's Motion to Dismiss. There
are genuine issued of material fact present in this case which
precluded the trial Court from granting Sweeney's Motion to
Dismiss.

The trial court also erred in granting Sweeney's Motion

for to dismiss because Sweeney was not entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.

EX
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER
OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED UDOT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER OF
LAW WHEN IT GRANTED SWEENEY'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
POINT I
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST IN THIS CASE WHICH
PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF UDOT.
In the i n s t a n t matter t h e r e are many genuine i s s u e s of
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material fact which precluded the trial court from granting
Summary Judgment in favor of UDOT.

If there is a dispute as to a

genuine issue of material fact, the appellate court must reverse
the grant of summary judgment and remand for trial on that issue.
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat1! Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
It is immaterial that the evidence on one side may appear to be
strong or even compelling.

Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755

P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Therefore, this Court must

reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of UDOT and remand
this matter to the trial court for a trial on the merits.
UDOT claims in paragraph No. 17 of its Answer to Mr.
Henshaw's Amended Complaint and also in paragraph No. 17 of its
Answer to Mr. Henshawfs Amended Complaint, that UDOT was willing
to accept final payment from Mr. Henshaw and was willing to
provide Mr. Henshaw with a Warranty Deed and, in fact, actually
prepared the warranty deed on October 13, 1987.
339).

(Record at page

Those facts are specifically disputed by Mr. Henshaw and

by the recordings and transcripts of Mr. Henshaw's conversations
with Max Williams and Dean Holbrook

See Exhibit No. 1 and

Exhibits "G," "H", "J", and "K", to Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in
Opposition to UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at
pages 467, 470, 481, 485).
In its Motion for Summary Judgment UDOT falsely claimed that
the Warranty Deed dated August 28, 1991, was prepared October 13,
1987.
facts.

Such an assertion is a deliberate misrepresentation of the
The form used for the August 28, 1991 deed may have been
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prepared on October 13, 1987; however, the Deed was not filled in
until August 28, 1991. A copy of a blank warranty deed
containing the same notation , i.e., "Prepared by JRP 10/13/87"
is attached to Mr. Henshawfs Memorandum in Opposition to UDOT's
Motion for Summary Judgment as Exhibit No. 2.

(Record at page

494) .
In paragraph No. 17 of its Answer, and in paragraph no. 17
of its Amended Answer UDOT claims it offered to give Mr. Henshaw
a Warranty Deed granting him fee simple title to the property.
Yet, in paragraph No. 10 of its Answer, UDOT claims it only gave
Sweeney "a right of way" to the property and not a fee title.
(Record at page 269-270).

Interestingly, UDOT failed to provide

a copy of the deed to Sweeney with its Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Therefore,

a genuine issue of fact exists as to what

type of interest Sweeney had in the property, what type of
interest Sweeney was selling to Mr. Henshaw, what type of
interest UDOT actually had in the property, and what type of
interest they were attempting to coerce Mr. Henshaw into
accepting by means of the Quit Claim Deed they insisted he
accept.
There is also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
UDOT would accept Mr. Henshaw1s tender of the final payment.
UDOT claims it never refused to accept the tender.

Mr. Henshawfs

Affidavit and the transcripts of conversations with UDOT
officials clearly indicate something differently.
pages 454, 465, 467, 470, 481, 485).
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(Record at

UDOT further asserts that Mr. Henshaw never tendered final
payment until August 28, 1991.

However, Mr. Henshaw1s Affidavit,

the transcripts of the conversations with UDOT representatives
and the letter from Gorgon Madden, clearly refute UDOT's
assertions.

(Record at pages 465, 466). Thus, genuine issues of

material fact exist which precluded the trial court from granting
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
UDOT also asserts that it did not know that Mr. Henshaw's
property did not belong to UDOT until after Salt Lake County
Flood Control had gone on the property and constructed a catch
basin and other structures on Mr. Henshaw's property.

Mr.

Henshaw's testimony, however, is that at the meeting with UDOT
and Flood Control officials, Williams declared that Mr. Henshaw
did not own the property and that Flood Control could do any
thing they wanted to do on the property.

(Record at page 465-

466) .
UDOT claims that they only learned of Mr. Brady's interest
in the property in 1991.

(Record at page 33 6).

However, both

Brady and his attorney informed Mr. Henshaw that Mr. Brady had
been working with UDOT for years to resolve his interest in the
property, and that UDOT specifically told Mr. Brady not to talk
to Mr. Henshaw about the property.

(Record at page 431-432).

Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when UDOT
first learned of Mr. Brady's interest in the property and the
reason for their failure to inform Mr. Henshaw of Mr. Brady's
claim.
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There are many issues of material fact present in this
matter which precluded the trial court from entering Summary
Judgment in favor of UDOT.

Therefore, the trial court committed

prejudicial and reversible error when it granted UDOT's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

Because the trial court committed

prejudicial and reversible error when it granted UDOT's Motion
for Summary Judgment, the judgment of the trial court must be
reversed and this matter remanded to the trial court for a trial
on Mr. Henshawfs claims.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING UDOT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
UDOT was not legally entitled to summary judgment under any
of its arguments to the trial court, even assuming, arguendo,
that there were not genuine issues of fact present in this case
which precluded the trial court from entering summary judgment in
favor of UDOT.

Because the trial court did not specify its

reasoning for granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment under
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but rather made
a general statement for the reasons specified in UDOT's Motion,
Mr. Henshaw will address the legal error in granting summary
judgment to UDOT on any of its legal theories.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, UDOT claimed that Mr.
Henshaw's First, Second, Third and Fifth causes of action failed
to state a claim against UDOT, and therefore, UDOT was entitled
to Summary Judgment as a matter of law.
23

In granting UDOT's

Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court committed
prejudicial and reversible err in granting UDOT's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

UDOT also claimed Mr. Henshaw1s Fifth Cause of

Action is barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and that
Mr. Henshaw1s First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action
are time barred.
A.

MR. HENSHAWS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION STATES A CLAIM AGAINST
UDOT.
In its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary

Judgment, UDOT falsely asserts that Mr. Henshawfs First Cause of
Action is based on the implied covenant of a Warranty Deed that
the grantor has good title and the right to convey.

(Record at

page 367). Mr. Henshaw's First Cause of Action entitled Breach
of Contract, Covenant to Convey Title is not based on the implied
covenant contained in a Warranty Deed; it is based on the express
covenant contained in paragraph No. 19 of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract between Sweeney and Mr. Henshaw. Paragraph No. 19 of the
Contract specifically states:
The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be
paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned agrees to
execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and
sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the above
described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except
as herein mentioned. . . . (Emphasis added). (Record at
page 457-458).
UDOT breached the covenant specified in paragraph 19 of the
Contract.

See Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibits "G", "H", HJ,f, and "K

to Mr. Henshawfs Memorandum in Opposition to UDOT's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

(Record at pages 467, 470, 481, 485 ). UDOT
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has admitted that it is bound by the terms covenants and
conditions of the Contract.
(Record at page 371-372).

See UDOT's Memorandum, page 11, f 1.
Consequently, UDOT is estopped to

claim that it did not covenant to convey a Warranty Deed to Mr.
Henshaw.

The breach of that covenant is set forth in Mr.

Henshaw's First Cause of Action.

Therefore, UDOT's assertion

that Mr. Henshaw's First Cause of Action fails to state a claim
for relief is totally without basis in fact or law and the trial
court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.

B.

MR. HENSHAW'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION STATES A CLAIM AGAINST
UDOT.
UDOT's also falsely asserted in its Motion for Summary

Judgment that Mr. Henshaw's Second Cause of Action for "Breach of
Quiet Enjoyment" was based on a Warranty Deed.
3 67).

(Record at page

Mr. Henshaw's claim of breach of quiet enjoyment is based

on the Contract between Sweeny and Mr. Henshaw not on a Warranty
Deed.

Although the Contract states that it is a "Uniform Real

Estate Contract," the Contract is in fact a land sales contract.
Pursuant to the Contract Mr. Henshaw was given possession of the
property.
A party in possession of property under a land sales
contract has the right to quiet possession and enjoyment of the
property if the party is performing on the Contract.

A person

having possession of the land is entitled to the beneficial use,
occupation and enjoyment of the land. 92 C.J.S. Vendor &
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Purchaser, § 284, § 285.

Vendee under a real estate contract has

the right to possession of the land, the right of dominion and
control of the land and the vendee may sue for trespass and to
enjoin construction offense.

Bays v. Haven, 777 P.d 562 Wash.

Alp. 324 (1989) ; Real Estate contracts are transfers of
equitable interest in property.

The purchaser has the right to

possession, the right to control the land, the right to sue for
trespass, the right to sue to quiet title and quiet possession.
Chelan County V. Wilson, 744 P.2d 1106, 49 Wash Alp. 628 (1987).
Mr. Henshaw's cause of action for Quiet Possession of the
property is based on the Contract between Mr. Henshaw and
Sweeney, not a Warranty Deed.

Under the Contract Mr. Henshaw is

entitled to quiet possession of the property.

UDOT has admitted

that all of the provisions of the Contract are obligatory on
UDOT.

(UDOT's Memorandum, page 11, f 2). (Record at page 372-

371).

Therefore, Mr. Henshaw's Second Cause of Action properly

states a claim.

UDOT's assertion that Mr. Henshaw's Second

Cause of Action fails to state a claim for relief is totally
without basis in fact or law and the trial court committed
prejudicial and reversible error when it granted UDOT's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

C.

MR. HENSHAWS FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY THE
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Again, contrary to UDOT's assertion, Mr. Henshaw's Fifth

Cause of Action entitled, Conspiracy to Defraud, is not barred by
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
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It is true that UDOT as a

State entity is immune from suit for any exercise of a
governmental function.

However, UDOT's purchase of Sweeney's

contract with Mr. Henshaw is not a state function.
While there are situations in which UDOT's buying and
selling real estate may be a state function.

UDOT's buying of

Sweeney's contract with Mr. Henshaw is not such a situation.
Buying and selling real estate contracts is not of its self a
governmental function, and it is certainly not a function of
UDOT.
UDOT's assertion that its condemnation of certain of
Sweeney's property was a governmental function, is probably
correct.

(Record at page 369). However, UDOT's purchase of the

Contract between Mr. Henshaw and Sweeney is clearly not a
governmental function, when that purchase was not in association
with any legitimate state function of UDOT.
UDOT is not in the real estate business.

UDOT did not buy

the Contract between Sweeney and Mr. Henshaw as part of any state
project, state contract or state purpose.

It is disingenuous for

UDOT to claim that its purchase of the Contract between Mr.
Henshaw and Sweeney is a governmental function for which UDOT has
immunity.
UDOT was under no legal obligation to buy the Contract from
Sweeney.

UDOT had given Sweeney a Quit Claim Deed for the

property, which Sweeney accepted.

Therefore, Sweeney got the

benefit of her bargain, and she took the property subject to all
liens, encumbrances and defects in title.
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Sweeney only received

as good of a title as UDOT had when it conveyed the property to
Sweeney, and that was a title subject to the claims by Proctor
and Brady.

UDOT cannot now claim that its purchase of the

contract between Mr. Henshaw and Sweeney was a "governmental
function."

Such an assertion is spurious at best.

Because Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended, § 63-30-3
specifies that "all governmental entities are immune from suit
for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental
function", UDOT is not immune from suit due to its conspiracy to
defraud Mr. Henshaw in connection with UDOT's purchase of the
Contract from Sweeney.

Therefore, UDOT's assertion that Mr.

Henshaw1s Fifth Cause of Action fails to state a claim for
relief, is totally without basis in fact or law and the trial
court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted
UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
D.

MR. HENSHAW'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT TIME BARRED.
In what is truly a novel approach to contract law, UDOT

asserts that it succeeded to Sweeney's breach with Mr. Henshaw
and, therefore, Mr. Henshaw's claim is barred by the statute of
limitations that began to run against UDOT at Sweeney's breach.
(UDOT's Memorandum, page 11, H 2).

(Record at page 372). In

support of this ridiculous argument, UDOT cites to several cases
that have no relevance whatsoever to UDOT's assertion that UDOT
did or could accede to Sweeney's Breach.
UDOT, however, did not, and cannot, cite to any case,
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statute or other authority supporting its assertion that a person
who buys a contract that has been breached by the person selling
the contract also buys the breach of the seller.

Such an

assertion is so ridiculous that it is mind boggling.

One cannot

breach a contract until he has an obligation to preform under
that contract.
UDOT had no obligation to convey Mr. Henshaw a Warranty Deed
to the property, and to provide Mr. Henshaw with title insurance
on the property until Mr. Henshaw tendered UDOT final payment on
the property.

Final payment was not tendered until March 1986.

Therefore, UDOT's breach occurred, at the earliest, in March of
1986, when UDOT first refused to accept Mr. Henshaw's payment and
provide Mr. Henshaw with a Warranty Deed and title insurance as
required by the Contract UDOT purchased from Sweeney.
It is undisputed that Mr. Henshaw did not tender final
payment to UDOT until March 1986, at the earliest.

UDOT did not,

and could not, breach the Contract with Mr. Henshaw until Mr.
Henshaw tendered the final payment to UDOT. When Mr. Henshaw
tendered final payment to UDOT and it refused to accept the
payment and refused to convey the property to Mr. Henshaw by a
Warranty Deed and provide Mr. Henshaw with title insurance, as
required by the Contract, UDOT breached the Contract with Mr.
Henshaw.
UDOT's breach of its covenant of good faith and fair dealing
also occurred at the earliest in March 1986, when Mr. Henshaw
tendered final payment to UDOT, and UDOT refused to accept the
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payment and refused to convey Mr. Henshaw a Warranty Deed and
provide Mr. Henshaw with title insurance, as required by the
Contract.
Mr. Henshawfs First Cause of Action and his Fourth Cause of
Action are based on a written agreement, i.e., the Contract.

The

breach of contract and the breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing are governed by a six-year statute of
limitations that began to run no earlier than March 1986. Mr.
Henshaw filed his Complaint against UDOT on February 6, 1992,
clearly within the six-year statute of limitations.
Mr. Henshaw's Complaint is not time barred.

Therefore,

Consequently, UDOT's

assertion that Mr. Henshaw's First and Fourth Cause of Action are
bared by the statute of limitations is totally without basis in
fact or law, and the trial court committed prejudicial and
reversible error when it granted UDOT's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

E.

MR. HENSHAWS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT TIME BARRED.
As previously set forth in this Brief, Mr. Henshaw's Second

Cause of Action is based on the Contract between Sweeney and Mr.
Henshaw.

UDOT's breach of the Contract, with respect to Mr.

Henshaw's possession and quiet enjoyment of the property, did not
occur until 1988. Mr. Henshaw filed his Complaint in February
1992, less than four years after the breach.

Therefore, Mr.

Henshaw's Second Cause of Action is not time barred by the
six-year statute of limitations as UDOT asserted in its Motion
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for Summary Judgment.

Consequently, UDOT's assertion that Mr.

Henshaw1s Second Cause of Action is barred by the statute of
limitations is totally without basis in fact or law, and the
trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it
granted UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.

F.

MR. HENSHAWS CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD" IS
NOT TIME BARRED.
Mr. Henshaw1s Cause of "Conspiracy to Defraud" is not time

barred.

Mr. Henshaw only learned upon receipt of UDOT's Answer

to its Amended Complaint, received in May 1994, that UDOT was
asserting that it never "transferred fee title" to Sweeney but
rather that UDOT "deeded only a right of way to Sweeney."
(UDOT's Answer to Mr. Henshaw's Amended Complaint, pages 2-3, 11
10; UDOT's Answer to Mr. Henshaw's Second Amended Complaint, page
7, H 37).

(Record at page 269-270, 342). Mr. Henshaw only

learned of Brady's interest in the property in 1991.
UDOT clearly knew at the time it was insisting that Mr.
Henshaw take a Quit Claim Deed and sign a release, absolving UDOT
from all liability in connection with the property, that UDOT had
only given Sweeny a "right of way" rather than fee title to the
property.

Nonetheless, UDOT conspired to defraud Mr. Henshaw

into taking a Quit Claim Deed rather than the Warranty Deed
required by the Contract.

UDOT knowingly, intentionally,

willfully and maliciously attempted to defraud Mr. Henshaw by
insisting that Mr. Henshaw take a Quit Claim Deed and into
signing a release, which would absolve UDOT of any liability on
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the Contract.
defraud.

Those actions of UDOT constitute conspiracy to

Mr. Henshaw only learned of UDOT's fraud from its

answers filed in this matter in May and July 1994.

Therefore,

Mr. Henshawfs cause of action for Conspiracy to Defraud is not
time barred by any statute of limitations.

Consequently, UDOT's

assertion that Mr. Henshaw's Fifth Cause of Action is bared by
the statute of limitations is totally without basis in fact or
law, and the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible
error when it granted UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE ARE NO
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRESENT IN THIS CASE WHICH
PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF SWEENEY.
Although Sweeney f i l e d a Motion t o Dismiss, t h e t r i a l court
considered m a t e r i a l o u t s i d e t h e p l e a d i n g s i n rendering i t s
d e c i s i o n , t h e r e f o r e , pursuant t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of Rule 12 of the
Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure, Sweeney's Motion was converted t o
a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Furthermore, a motion t o d i s m i s s

i s reviewed under t h e same standard used t o review a motion for
summary judgment. See Mountain American Credit Union v .
McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah App. 1993).
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MR. HENSHAWS
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AROSE IN JULY 1985.
The t r i a l court erred in concluding t h a t Mr. Henshaw's cause

of a c t i o n for breach of c o n t r a c t a g a i n s t Sweeney arose i n J u l y
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1985.

The contract between Mr. Henshaw and the Defendant was to

run from June 1976 until the purchase price of $35,00.00, at 9%
interest, was paid in full, at the rate of $350.00 per month.
See

Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in Opposition to Sweeny's Motion to

Dismiss. (Record at page 111-112).
In July 1985, at Sweeney's request, Mr. Henshaw agreed to
accelerate the contract and pay Sweeney the remainder due under
the terms of the contract.

See

Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in

Opposition to Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss.

(Record at page 114).

However, Mr. Henshaw and Sweeney never actually agreed on a final
payoff figure for the property.

See

Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in

Opposition to Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss.
115).

(Record at page 114-

Thought Mr. Henshaw wanted Sweeney to discount the payment

in return for the early payoff, the final payment on the contract
was not yet due.

See

Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in Opposition to

Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss.

(Record at page 114).

Although, from July 1985 through March 1986, Sweeney did not
accept a final payoff from Mr. Henshaw, Sweeney never actually
said that she would not accept a final payoff amount from Mr.
Henshaw.

Sweeney only told Mr. Henshaw that she could not accept

any payments at those points in time, because she was working
with UDOT to resolve some problems on the property; however,
Sweeney did not tell Mr. Henshaw what those problems were.

See

Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in Opposition to Sweeny's Motion to
Dismiss.

(Record at page 115).

Because Sweeney did not actually refuse to accept Mr.
33

Henshaw's final payment and because final payment on the contract
was not yet due, Sweeney1s Breach did not occur until Sweeney
manifested her intention not to abide by the terms of the
contract.

The intention was not manifested until UDOT informed

Mr. Henshaw that Sweeney had assigned the contract to UDOT.
Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that Sweeny's
breach occurred in July 1985.
prejudicial and reversible.

The trial court's error was

Consequently, the trial court's

order dismissing Mr. Henshaw's Complaint must be reversed and
this matter remanded to the trial court for a trial on the
merits.

B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT MR. HENSHAWS
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SWEENEY FOR FRAUDULENT
INDUCEMENT ACCRUED NO LATER THAN JULY 1985.
The undisputed facts of this matter are that Mr. Henshaw did

not learn that Sweeney was unable to convey clear title to the
property, because Richard Brady had title to the property, until
the Spring of 1991.

See

Mr. Henshaw's Memorandum in Opposition

to Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss.

(Record at page 115). Therefore,

Mr. Henshaw did not discover Sweeney's fraud until the Spring of
1991.
Mr. Henshaw's cause of action for Fraudulent Inducement
could not occur until he knew of Sweeney's fraud.

Therefore, the

trial court erred in concluding that Mr. Henshaw's cause of
action for Fraudulent Inducement occurred in July 1985.
trial court's error was prejudicial and reversible.
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The

Consequently, the trial court's order dismissing Mr. Henshaw's
Complaint must be reversed and this matter remanded to the trial
court for a trial on the merits.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT
SWEENY WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court was correct in
concluding that Mr. Henshaw1s causes of action for Breach of
Contract and Fraudulent Inducement occurred in July 1985, the
trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Sweeney
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Sweeney's Motion was based on Sweeney's argument that Mr.
Henshaw's causes of action against her were barred by the
appropriate statute of limitations.

However, under clear and

controlling Utah law, Sweeney is precluded from relying on the
statute of limitations as a defense to Mr. Henshaw's Complaint,
even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court was correct in
concluding that Mr. Henshaw's causes of action occurred in July
1985.
In Vencent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah
1981), the Utah Supreme Court held a plaintiff's cause of action
was not barred by Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-13 until the
plaintiff actually discovered the damage to his property.

By

parity of reasoning, Mr. Henshaw's causes of action did not arise
until Mr. Henshaw learned of Sweeny's breach of her contract with
Mr. Sweeney, i.e., when Mr. Henshaw learned of the conveyance of
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the property from Sweeney to UDOT and learned of Sweeney's
assignment of her interest in the contract to UDOT, i.e., in
March of 1986.
Although Sweeney deeded the property to UDOT, and also
assigned her interest in the contract to UDOT in November 1985,
Sweeney deliberately concealed those facts from Mr. Henshaw.
Because Sweeney deliberately concealed the fact that she had
conveyed the property to UDOT and the fact that she had assigned
her interest in the property to UDOT from Mr. Henshaw, she is now
estopped to claim the statute of limitations as a defense to Mr.
Henshaw's causes of action against her.
In Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 314 (Utah App. 1987),
the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
For example, in some circumstances, where the statute
of limitations would normally bar a claim, proof of
concealment or misleading by the defendant precludes
the defendant from raising the statute of limitations
defense.
See also, Meyers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)
declaring:
In other circumstances, where the statute of
limitations would normally apply, this Court has held
that proof of concealment or misleading by the
defendant precludes the defendant from relying on the
statute of limitations.
Furthermore, in Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22,
456 P.2d 159, 163 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court held:
One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a
false sense of security thereby subjecting his claim to
the bar of limitations, and then be heard to plead that
very delay as a defense to the action when brought.
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In the instant action, Sweeney continually represented to
Mr. Henshaw that she would consummate the sale of the property to
Mr. Henshaw when she solved the problems with UDOT.

See Mr.

Henshaw's Memorandum in Opposition to Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss.
(Record at page 114-115).

Mr. Henshaw justifiably relied upon

Sweeney's representations and continued to contact her to
negotiate a final payment price for the property, until he was
notified by UDOT that Sweeney had conveyed the property to UDOT
and had assigned her interest in the contract to UDOT.
Sweeney, however, transferred the title to the property to
UDOT and assigned her interest in the contract to UDOT and
deliberately concealed her actions from Mr. Henshaw.

Therefore,

even assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Henshaw's causes of action
against Sweeny occurred in July 1985, as asserted by Sweeney in
her Memorandum in Support of her Motion to Dismiss, Sweeney is
estopped, by her concealment of her transfer of the property and
her assignment of her interest in the contract to UDOT, from
asserting the statute of limitations as a defense in this action
to Mr. Henshaw's causes of action.

Therefore, Mr. Henshaw's

causes of actions against Sweeny are not time barred by any
statute of limitations.

Because Mr. Henshaw's causes of

action against Sweeny are not barred by any statute of
limitations, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible
error when it granted Sweeny's Motion to Dismiss.

Therefore, the

trial court's dismissal of Mr. Henshaw's causes of action against
Sweeney for Breach of Contract and Fraudulent Inducement must be
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reversed and this matter remanded to the trial court for a trial
on the merits.
Mr. Henshaw has chosen not to proceed with his claim of
Intentional Infliction of emotional Distress against Sweeny.

X
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error
when it granted UDOT'S Motion for Summary Judgment and when it
granted Sweeney's Motion to Dismiss.

Therefore, the trial

court's grant of Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss must be
reversed and the case remanded for trial.
W H E R E F O R E , Mr. Henshaw respectfully request that the
Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss entered by the trial court
be reversed and this matter be remanded to the trial court for a
trial on the merits.
Dated this J_

day of March 1995.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Dee Henshaw
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as Amended, § 63-30-3
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, § 78-2-2 (3)(j)
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, § 78-2-2(4)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12
92 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser, § 284, § 285
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665
Section
63-30-37.
63-30-38.

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by government employee.
Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required.

63-30-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Utah Governmental Immunity Act."
1965
83-30-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action
for money or damages against a governmental
entity or against an employee.
(2) (a) "Employee" includes a governmental
entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of an advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section 62A-4-603, student teachers certificated
in accordance with Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing services to members of the public in the
course of an approved medical, nursing, or
other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does
not include an independent contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether
or not the individual holding that position
receives compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state
and its political subdivisions as defined in this
chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any
act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether
or not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental
function, unique to government, undertaken
in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.
(b) A "governmental function" may be
performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental
entity.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person,
damage to or loss of property, or any other injury
that a person may suffer to his person, or estate,
that would be actionable if inflicted by a private
person or his agent.
(6)^"Personal injury" means an injury of any
kind other than property damage.
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county,
city, town, school district, pubhc transit district,
redevelopment agency, special improvement or
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss
of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or
personal property.
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department, agency, authority,
commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.
1991

63-30-3. Immunity of
from suit.

63-30-4
governmental

entities

(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of
a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other governmental health
care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing,
or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in either public or private facilities.
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the
following state medical programs and services
performed at a state-owned university hospital
are unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and are considered to be
governmental functions:
(i) care of a patient referred by another
hospital or physician because of the high risk
nature of the patient's medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available
in Utah only at a state-owned university
hospital or provided in Utah only by physicians employed at a state-owned university
acting in the scope of their employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive
appropriate medical care or treatment at another medical facility in Utah; and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned university hospital
or by physicians employed at a state-owned
university acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds is unique or essential to the core of governmental activity
in this state.
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds
the limits established in Section 63-30-34, the
claimant may submit the excess claim to the
Board of Examiners and the Legislature under
Title 63, Chapter 6.
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and
governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities.
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice
Center are immune from suit for any injury which
results from their joint intergovernmental functions
at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4.
1991
63-30-4.

Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of
waiver of immunity — Exclusive remedy — J o i n d e r of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless
specifically provided, may be construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility by
or for governmental entities or their employees.
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this
chapter, consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the
entity were a private person.
«(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is
created by any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict liability or absolute liability.
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as
adversely affecting any immunity from suit that a

(6) There is created the office of associate chief jusfa The term of office of the associate chief justice is
& years The associate chief justice may s e r v e i n
L
«l office no more than two successive terms The
Kiate chief justice shall be elected by a majority
_.j of the members of the Supreme Court and shall
Mllocated duties as the chief justice determines If
p* chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
Krve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief
Mice The chief justice may delegate responsibilities
Hlthe associate chief justice as consistent with law
1990

SM-1.5,78-2-1.6.

Repealed.

1971, 1981

%1*2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(i) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
Uttwer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
foue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
IJI writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
irders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
deluding jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals,
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
Court of Appeals,
(c) discipline of lawyers,
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission,
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with
d) the Public Service Commission,
(n) the State Tax Commission,
(in) the Board of State Lands and Forestry,
dv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, or
(v) the state engineer,
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
agencies under Subsection (e),
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of
record holding a statute of the United States or
this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah
Constitution,
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony,
(i) appeals from the district court involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and
0) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does
not have original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of
an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony,
(b) election and voting contests,
(c) reapportionment of election districts,
(d) retention or removal of public officers, and
(e) those matters desertbe«' in Subsections
(3)(a) through (d)
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion m
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
w

78-za-z

JUDICIAL CODE

IB

the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b)
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its reviewjrf
tnM
1992
agency adjudicative proceedings

78-2-3. Repealed.

19M

78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges
pro tempore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for use in the courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process The
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
perform any judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
admitted to practice law in Utah
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
the practice of law
1986
78-2-5.

Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals The
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be established by the appellate court administrator, and
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court
1986

78-2-7. Repealed.

1980

78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance
and services of any .sheriff in the state
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986, 1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF A P P E A L S
Section
78-2a-l
78-2a-2
78-2a-3
78-2a-4
78-2a-5

Creation — Seal
Number of judges — Terms — Functions
— Filing fees
Court of Appeals jurisdiction
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
shall have a seal
\gm

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of
the appointment Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until

Rule 12

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

tion of this rule is a question of law. Taylor v.
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991,).
—Sanctions.
This rule gives trial courts great leeway to
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of
the particular case. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor,
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Attaching the wrong document to a complaint violated this rule because a reasonable
inquiry would have revealed the mistake;
award of attorney fees was appropriate because
the error caused defendants to incur legal expense in researching the validity of an irrelevant document and preparing a motion to dismiss based on it. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor,
770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Award of costs and attorney fees was an appropriate sanction for attempting to go forward
with a class action that, in light of the complete resolution of the matter eleven months
prior, was "unconscionable and beyond reason." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863
P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
—Standard.
Sanctions were improper against an attor-
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ney, where opposing parties conceded that no
particular document was signed in violation of
the rule, but simply argued that even if the
attorney believed the case was well grounded
when he filed the complaint, he should have
known after he met with counsel for defendants that the case could not go forward.
Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Utah appellate courts shpuld use the threestandard approach in reviewing a trial court's
Rule 11 findings. This approach includes: (1)
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) reviewing the trial court's ultimate conclusion that
Rule 11 was violated and any subsidiary legal
conclusions under the correction of error standard; and (3) reviewing the trial court's determination as to the type and amount of sanction
to be imposed under the abuse of discretion
standard. Barnard v. >Suthff, 846 P.2d 1229
(Utah 1992).
Cited in Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Rimensburger v.
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — Attorney's Fees, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 342.
Brigham Young Law Review. — Curbing
Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough Is
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 579.
Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 597,
Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues —
De Novo or Abuse of Discretion? Thomas v.
Capital Security Services, Inc., 1989 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 877.
Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics,
1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 959.
Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule 11: The
New Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-andThink-Again" Rule, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 879.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading
§§ 339 to 349.
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 339 to 366.
A.L.R. — Liability of attorney, acting for client, for malicious prosecution, 46 A.L.R.4th
249.
Inherent power of federal district court to
impose monetary sanctions on counsel in absence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 789.
Comment Note — General principles regarding imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed.
107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions for defamation, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in action
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96
A.L.R. Fed. 13.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions for infliction of emotional distress, 98
A.L.R. Fed. 442.
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to
signing and verification of pleadings, in antitrust actions, 99 A.L.R. Fed. 573.
Procedural requirements for imposition of
sanctions under Rule M, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556.
Key Numbers. — Pleading «=» 287 to 304.

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under

35

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 12

this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of
the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following* defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shaii p^int out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the
motion is granted and the order of the court as not obeyed within ten days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such
order as it deems just.
(f) Motion* to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be

ruiie rz

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

36

raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objection* \vhieh
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion Of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
d) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any bffi$er, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment inserted "and complaint" in the first sentence.

Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 12, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Motions generally,
U R.C.P. 7

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction over the person.
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
—Matters outside of pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
Rights of opposing party.
Motion for more definite statement.
—Bill of particulars.
—Criteria
—Motion to dismiss distinguished.
—Purpose.
Delay.
Obtaining evidence.
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
—Explained.
—Improper.
—Standard.
—Standard of review.
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue.
—Forum-selection clause in contract.
Presentation of defenses.
—How presented
Affirmative defenses.
Divorce
Election of remedies.
Failure to state claim upon which relief
can be granted.

General and special appearances.
Statute of frauds.
Venue.
—When presented.
Amended answer.
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff.
—Failure to file.
Summary judgment.
—Conversion of motion to dismiss.
—Court's discretion.
—Court's initiative.
—Defenses.
—Opportunity to present pertinent material.
—Preclusion.
Issues of fact.
Waiver of defenses.
—Defect of parties.
—Defective service of process.
—Exceptions.
Subject matter jurisdiction.
When issues raised.
—Failure to join indispensable party.
—Failure to pay consideration.
—Mutual mistake.
—Statute of frauds.
—Statute of limitations.
—Waiver.

VENDOR & PURCHASER §§ 284-286

92 C.J.S.

rescind and surrender possession, or, if he retains
possession, pay the purchase price. 1 5

§ 285. Use, Occupation, and Enjoyment

§ 286.

Waste
a. By vendor
b. By purchaser

Tue person having the right to possession is entitled
to the beneficial use, occupation, and enjoyment of the
property.

a. By Vendor
Except as far a» his rights may be enlarged by the
terms of the contract, a vendor remaining In possession is liable for waste committed by him after the
execution of the contract of sale.

Where the purchaser is entitled to the posaession,
as considered supra § 284, he is entitled to the beneficial use, occupation, and enjoyment of the propOn the other hand, where the right to
ertyi6
possession is in the vendor, as discussed supra § 284,
he h^ the exclusive right of beneficial enjoyment
for the time being. 17 A purchaser who, at the time
specified in the contract for delivery of possession,
gave the vendor permission to occupy the premises
together with purchaser for a reasonable time, may
not within such reasonable time revoke such permission without reason. 18

Except as far as his rights may be enlarged by tht
terms of the contract, 19 a vendor remaining in pes
session is liable for waste committed by him after
the execution of the contract of sale, 20 although
what will or will not amount to waste necessarily
depends on what is a reasonable and proper use of
the property by the vendor according to the circumstances of the particular case. 2 1 The purchase?
may sue to enjoin the vendor from committing
waste, 2 2 refuse to accept a conveyance unless compensation is made or tendered, 23 or, after hw title
is perfected, sue to recover damages. 24

15. Cal.—Worley v. Nethercott, supra.
66 C.J. P 1036 note 77.
16. La.—Valley Camp, W. O. W., v.
Bethany Lodge. P. & A. M., App.,
190 So. 833.
Tenn.—Culwell v. Culwell, 133 S.W.
2d 1009. 23 Tenn.App. 389.
66 C.J. P 1037 note 80.
Care of citrus grove
Under contract for sale of citrus
grove providing that price was to be
paid In semiannual installments, and
that purchasers were required to
reimburse vendors for money advanced for care and operation of
property, purchasers were under no
obligation properly to care for or cultivate, disc, fertilize, and spray the
property.—Snidow v. Hill, 197 P.2d
801, 87 Cal.App.2d 803.
Instruction held error
In vendee's action of trespass
against vendor, who had rented property after discovering it had been vacated by vendee, to recover one
month's rent, action of court in instructing Jury to return verdict in
favor of plaintiff for entire amount
of rent paid by lessee was error.—
Drane v. Graves, BS S.W.2d 927, 261
Ky. 787.
Taxes
Under contract for sale of citrus
grove providing that price was to be
paid in semiannual installments, and
that terms of agreement were subject to terms of trust deed, provisions of trust deed for payment of
taxes and for maintenance and care
of property were not sufficiently incorporated into sales agreement by
reference to charge purchasers with
liability for such obligations.—Snidow v. Hill, 187 P.2d 801, 87 Cal.App.
2d 803.

Use of adjoining property
Orai agreement by vendor, that
purchaser could use gas and water
pipes and electric lines from adjoining property of vendor provided purchaser paid her portion of utility
bills that would accrue, was terminable at will by either party and was
not enforceable by purchaser or her
tenant.—Richmond
v. Broughton,
Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 842, refused
for want of merit.
17. Mass.—Barrel! v. Britton, 138 N.
E. 579, 244 Mass. 273, 28 A.L.K.
1065.
Agreement for purchase price
An agreement between payee and
maker of note for purchase price of
land that payee and his wife should
have use of rooms occupied by them
in house on land and half of barn
thereon, and be furnished firewood by
maker as long as payee or his wife
lived, gave them right to live on
property during their lives and obtain firewood from maker without
payment therefor, so that maker's
crossaction for rent and breach of
contract in action on note by executor of deceased payee's will was demurrable, where wife was still living.
—Cady v. Cady, 10 S.E.2d 231, 63 Ga.
App. 191.
Itoss of vendee's title
Where at time vendor, holding a
second lien, rented the property
which had been vacated by vendee,
and vendee had lost title by reason
of the execution of a tax deed, vendee could not maintain an action in
trespass against vendor, since vendee
had neither possession nor title.—
Drane v. Graves, 88 S.W.2d 927. 261
Ky. 787,
Punitive damage*
Where vendor, discovering vendee
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had vacated property which wairapidly depreciating because of aban
donment, and which was in state of
considerable disrepair, instituted action to enforce lien and after consulting attorney rented property, evidence in vendee's action for treapa**was insufficient to authorize instruction on, or recovery of, punitive darnages.—Drane v. Graves, supra.
18. Mo.—Parrish v. Hartman, App
235 S.W. 463,
19. N.C.—Crawley •. Timberlake. 3?
N.C. 460.
Reservation of right to out and re.
move timber
Wash.—Rauch v. Zander, 245 P. 17
138 Wash. 610.
66 C.J. p 1037 note 85.
20. Cal.—Kennedy
v.
Rosecra*?Gardens, Inc., 249 P.2d 593. 1H
Cal.App.2d 87.
S.D—Foulke v. Suurmeyer, 266 N
W 151, 64 S.D 267.
66 C.J. *, 3 037 note 86.
Where house was destroyed by art
during period between execution of
alleged contract of sale and date for
delivery, purchaser to recover for
the burning of a house as waste wa*
required to establish that vrndu*
caused the fire, either intentionalh
or negligently.—Osterloh v. Osterloh
285 N.W. 742, 231 Wis. 319.
21. N.C—Crawley • . Timberlake, 3T
N.C. 460.
66 C.J. p 1037 note 87.
22. Kan.—Holmberg v. Johnson, 2S
P. 575, 45 Kan. 197.
23. Ky.—Durrett v. Simpson's Representatives, 3 T.B.Mon. 517, 1C
Am.D. 115.
24. Ark.—Newman v. Mountain Park

j§ 286-287 VENDOR & PURCHASER
Holder of option may not, after the option is exercised, sue the vendor in trespass for the cutting
and removal of timber before the option was exercised. 25 There is, however, authority to the contrary 26

b. By Purchaser
A t long as the security of the vendor is not l m .
paired, a purchaser in possession will not be held liable
for waste.

While the rights of the purchaser of land in this
respect may be either enlarged27 or restricted28 by
the provisions of the contract, ordinarily, where he
has a right to possession, he may cut, sell, or remove
timber29 and will not be enjoined from, or held
liable for, such acts as the clearing of land and the
cutting and removal of timber as long as the security
of the vendor is not impaired thereby.30 The purchaser, however, has no right to commit acts which
so diminish the value of the property as to impair
the vendor's security,31 and if he docs so a court of
equity will protect the rights of the vendor,32 either
by enjoining the purchaser from committing the
waste, 33 or by the appointment of a receiver,34

92 C.J.S.

some proceeding to stay the waste and not an action
for damages being the proper remedy in such cases. 35 The purchaser will also be liable for waste
where he goes into possession wrongfully and without the consent of the vendor,36 or where he remains
in possession after a rescission or abandonment of
the contract; 37 but one of two joint purchasers is
not liable for waste which without his knowledge
or consent is committed by the other.3*

§ 287.

Crops

The purchaser is the owner of crops planted and
grown by him ?*c<»pt to the extent that the vendor has
some right, title, or m u t e s t under the provisions of the
contract.

As to the ownership of crops planted or sowed and
grown by the purchaser in possession under a contract of sale the relation of the vendor and purchaser is said to be analogous to that of landlord
and tenant 39 or of mortgagee and mortgagor in possession ; 40 but a particular contract may be so
worded and construed as to create the relation of
tenants in common as to the crops.4'1 The purchaser is the owner of such crops 42 except to the ex-

Land Co., 107 S.W. 391, 85 Ark. 208.
122 Am S Pv. 27.
66 C.J. p 1037 note 90.
25. G a . ~ V a r n Turpentine A Cattle
Co. v. Allen & N e w t o n , 144 S.E. 47.
38 Ga.App. 408.
26. U.S.—McCarroll v. N e w s h a m , C.
C.A.La.. 278 P. 4.
27. W i s . — H o i l e v. Bailey, 17 N.W.
322. 58 W i t . 434.
28. M i s s . — L e a s e r v. Dame, 26 So.
961, 77 Miss. 708.
66 C.J. p 1037 note 94.
29. Ala.—Griffin v. State, 2 So.2d
921, 30 Ala.App. 194.
66 C.J. p 1037 note 95.
30. Ala.—Griffin v. State, supra.
66 C.J. p 1038 note 96.
31. N\T.—In re De Stuers* E s t a t e .
99 M . Y S 2 d 739. 190 Misc. 777.
66 C.J. p 1038 note 97.
32. W.Va — S p i e s v. B u t t s , 53 S.E.
897, 59 W.Va. 385.
33. K y . - M a y v. Williams, 60 S.W.
525. 109 Ky. 682, 22 Ky.L. 1328.
66 C.J. p 1038 note 99.

N.J.—McKenna v. Reade, 144 A- 812.
105 N.J.Law 408.
3 a Ind.—State
v.
Gramelspacher.
26 N.E. 81, 126 Ind. 398.
3d. N.M.—Snipes v. D e x t e r Gin Co..
116 P.2d 1019. 45 N.M. 475.
66 C.J. p 1039 note 18.
40. N.M.—Snipes v. D e x t e r Gin Co..
supra.
66 C.J. p 1039 note 19.
41. Idaho.—Federal Land Bank of
Spokane v. McCIoud, 20 P.2d 201.
51* Idafio 694.
B i g h t to o n e - h a l f crops
(1) A contract for the s a l e o f land
requiring the vendee to deliver onehalf of the crops to the vendor Is
sufficiently complied with If the vendee m a k e s delivery of the grain to
the elevator a s belonging to the vendor.—Dimmitt Elevator Co. v. Carter, Tex.Civ.App.. 70 S.W.2d 615.
(2) An e l e v a t o r company b u y i n g
wheat from a vendee in p o s s e s s i o n
without actual notice of a contract
provision g i v i n g the vendor the right
to one-half of the crops Is not liable
34. W . V a . — S p i e s v. B u t t s , 53 S.E. to the vendor for conversion, where
such contract w a s not recorded.—
897, 59 W.Va. 385.
Dimmitt E l e v a t o r Co. v. Carter, s u 35. W i s . — S t a u f f e r
v.
Eaton,
13 pra.
Ohio 322.
v.
Lancaster.
W i s . — N o r t h r u p v. Trask, 39 W i s . 42. Mont.—Hanson
226 P.2d 105. 124 Mont. 4 4 1 — H a m 515.
ilton v. Rock. 191 P.2d 663, 121
36. M i n n — C . H. P h i n n e y Land Co.
Mont. 245—Kester v. Amon, 261 P.
v. C o o l i d g e - S c h u s s l e r Co., 105 N.
288, 81 Mont. 1, followed In BakW. 553. 97 Minn. 204.
ken v. K e s t e r , 261 P. 294, 81 Mont.
66 C.J. p 1038 note 3.
18.
37. K y . — B a r t l e t t v. B l a n t o n . 4 J.J. N\M.—Snipes v. D e x t e r Gin Co., 116
Marsh. 426.
P.2d 1019, 45 N.M. 475.
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T e x . — D i m m i t t E l e v a t o r Co. • . Carter, Civ.App.. 70 S.W 2d 615.
Wash.—Loudon v Cooper. 100 P.2d
4 2. 3 Wash.2d 229—Short v. Short,
40 P.2d 752. 180 Wash. 614.
66 C.J. p 1039 note 21.
Conversion
(1) Vendor's refusal to a l l o w purc h a s e r to take hay to which purchaser r i g h t f u l l y held title, and vendor's
s e l l i n g of hay to another c o n s t i t u t e d
a conversion.—Goff v. Files. 174 A.
901. 133 Me. 157, 95 A.L.R. 1123.
(2) S t a t e m e n t In record that refusal of vendor to a l l o w purchaser
to take hay Is conversion claimed
sufficiently alleged demand, w h i c h
warranted Inference that refusal w a s
In consequence of s demand, or that
there w a s such refusal a s to waive
n e c e s s i t y of a demand.—Coff v. F i l e s ,
supra,
Crop m o r t g a g e e
(1) In action b e t w e e n conditional
vendor and holder of m o r t g a g e on
crops g i v e n by conditional purchasers of land, where purchasers remained in possession a f t e r conditional sale contract had been terminated
and were in p o s s e s s i o n at time of
harvest, crop m o r t g a g e e w a s e n t i tled to proceeds, since purchasers
were holding a s t e n a n t s adverse to
o w n e r s . — S c o t t v. California F a r m ing Co., 40 P.2d 850, 4 Cal.App.2d 232.
(2) Vendor, w h o waived forfeiture
of conditional contract to sell land by
a c c e p t i n g an a s s i g n m e n t of p u r c h a s er's i n t e r e s t In the land w i t h k n o w l edge t h a t purchasers had e x e c u t e d
a m o r t g a g e on the crops t o another.

